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Abstract 
Although economic growth is considered to be one of the most discussed and studied topics by economists, some questions 
are hitherto unexplored. In this article we will try to address one of these issues by studying the effect of hegemonic 
countries’ growth shocks on the growth of peripheral countries. By using a SVEC model, we have shown that although 
peripheral countries’ integration into trade relations with center countries may allow short and medium-term growth, it 
prevents them from confirming their long-term economic independence. 
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1. Introduction 
There is no doubt that economic growth is one of the most discussed topics by economists. Such 
studies are divided into three distinct areas. The first focused on the sources of growth (exogenous 
growth versus endogenous growth), the second analyzed the growth effects on macroeconomic 
variables while the third axis studied and identified the key macroeconomic variables that can affect 
growth. 
 
It is worth noting that the importance of our chosen topic inside the literature in the field is based on 
two principles. First, in our paper we suppose that the growth of center countries is relatively 
dependant of that of peripheral countries. The logic of this interdependence is conceptualized in 
term of growth shocks. Second, our paper does not consider the classical indicators which are often 
used to analyze the center-periphery model (exchange terms, international trade indicators etc). 
Indeed, a new approach will be used trying to analyzing the effect of growth shocks on long-run 
growth. 
 
However, to our knowledge, no study has been able to examine the effect of the economic growth of 
one country on the economic growth of other countries, despite many theories that are geared 
towards similar problems. Thus, the main purpose of this article is to study the effect of developed 
countries’ growth on developing countries’ growth and vice versa. Indeed, the importance of such a 
relationship is to test two hypotheses often questioned and rarely verified. To what extent does the 
growth in developed countries affect the growth of Developing countries? Does a symmetrical 
exchange of growth exist? If not the case, what kind of country benefits more from the growth 
exchange? Thus, this paper will try to respond to all questions asked above. 
 
In order to solve the problematic and address this range of issues, we will be forced, in the first 
section, to expose the main explanatory theories of development1 and in the second section, to focus 
on the appropriate methodology to determine the effect of growth shocks (in developed countries) 
on developing countries’ growth and vice versa. The third section will analyze and interpret the 
empirical results. The fourth section will conclude the main results of the paper. 
2. Development theories and transmission mechanisms 
According to liberal theory, development is the result of trade exchange that can take place between 
two countries regardless of their state of development. According to the classical view, the exchange 
between a central region (which is considered industrialized) and a peripheral region, allows the 
convergence of initially unbalanced growth in the long-run. Indeed, it is admitted that central regions 
(where wellbeing exceeds that recorded in peripheral regions due to industrialization) transmit, 
                                               
1 According to Perroux (1961) development is "the combination of mental and social changes in a population which 
make it suitable to grow cumulatively and sustainably its real and global product". 
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through the exchange, some gain of productivity due to the specialization. 
 
The Ricardian model of comparative advantage that of the HOS (based on the factor endowments of 
a trading region) and all posterior models have converged towards a consensus stating that all 
exchangers can benefit from the exchange. However, these models have not asked the questions 
underlying the distribution of profits or the trade effects on underdevelopment. Indeed, in liberal 
philosophy it is most important that the exchange lead to reciprocal gains. Who benefits most from 
these gains remains a secondary question. Smith summed up the charitable exchange saying, "Give 
me what I need and you’ll have from me, that, you need". This line of conduct constitutes the basic 
logic and the strategic guideline of the international financial institutions (IFIs) that have summarized 
the issue of development as a country’s mere consent to open its borders to trade. 
 
Beyond these theoretical discussions and far away from all criticism there is a main truth. 
Commercial exchange is beneficial to both consumers (who have more varieties of goods) and 
producers (who will enjoy a wider sized market). However, could these gains recorded by a country 
engender development? The answer to this question is a-priori negative, especially when the 
exchange takes place between a developed and a developing country. 
  
Indeed, it is commonly accepted that trade exchange allows a more specific and specialized 
international division of labour. Also, it allows an efficient reallocation of economic resources which 
results from sectorial specialization. Thus, two types of economies are created: the first concerning 
developing countries where the productive sectors are, generally, labour-intensive (e.g. primary and 
tertiary sectors); the second is related to developed countries where there are capital-intensive 
sectors. 
 
It is worth noting that such specialization and international division of labour can generate growth 
for the two economic types, but not necessarily the develop-ment or at least "developing 
development" concept to which we are so attached because it distinguishes the development of 
socio-economic structures (UAE, Denmark, Norway etc.) from the development that can generate 
development for third countries (USA, UK, France, Japan etc..). 
 
In this context, Prebisch (1950), partisan and defender of the economic independence theories, 
emphasized in his work the ideal appearance of economic theories which veil the actual outcomes of 
economic exchange. Often, when periphery countries have recorded deterioration in their terms of 
trade in the medium and long-term, economic exchange does not lead to a fair exchange. In order to 
cope, the peripheral countries need to develop strategies based on import substitution industries 
(ISI). 
 
Gunnar Myrdal (1978) accused the market mechanisms that are unable, on a macroeconomic scale, 
to ensure equilibrium. Thus, the free market mechanisms, which are based on the supply and 
demand forces and on price flexibility at domestic and / or international level, can only exacerbate 
inequality. He states that the entire structure of developing countries’ economies and international 
trade has become this distorted and unbalanced as a result of generations of uncontrolled market 
forces. This is explained by the fact that nothing can be less effective than developed countries’ 
selfish policies. In this context, Krugman (1990), who tried to develop Myrdal‘s thesis, has shown 
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that even if the structure of localization between the center and the peripheral is unchanged, the 
centre peripheral logic always appears. Thus, the welfare recorded in the center region is acquired 
only at the expense of welfare in the peripheral region. In other words, there is a trade-o  between 
the two zones in terms of growth and wellbeing. 
 
For his part, Arghiri (1975) refuted the assumption of trade ex-change fairness between countries 
with different development levels. The author assumes that international trade between the periphery 
and the center never leads to an equal exchange. Also, the said exchange, equal in appearance and 
uneven in its logic, involves the economic exploitation of the periphery by developing countries. 
 
Indeed, as long as developed countries (center) export capital-intensive goods and developing 
countries (periphery) export labour-intensive goods, then it follows that exchange between the two 
groups of countries can be neither fair nor just. In other words, given that the peripheral countries 
export goods containing strong labour values and import goods with low labour values (capital 
goods), this leads to a transfer of surplus profit, from developing to developed countries. For Amin 
(1973), the capitalist mode of production is the principal cause of under development affecting 
southern countries. They are obliged to trade with developed countries while accepting unfair trade 
rules and principles. Hence it can be concluded that there will be a wealth transfer from the 
periphery countries to those of the center, allowing them to further their development to the 
detriment of developing countries. For Huriot and Perreur (1995), the core-periphery structure, 
supposed to be "a source of inequality, asymmetry, polarization and domination", should not be seen 
through a "very simplistic" dualism, but rather examined in terms of «diffuse, progressive and 
subjective centrality. » The authors present a model in which they incorporate, in addition to the 
aspects of inequality, asymmetry and polarization, domination which is related to center-periphery 
structure, the valuation of which they call "symbolism and pure imaginary ” which is related to the 
idea of center-periphery. 
 
Grasland and Hamme (2010) highlight that disequilibrium between the center and peripheral area is 
evidence. This disequilibrium observed both in the world and in Europe, is mostly due to the 
division of labour. The authors have concluded, from a time series on the international exchange, 
that there was a reconstruction of world trade between 1975 and 2005 and that an industrial 
relocation was also produced at European level. Thus this industrial relocation redefined the list of 
goods produced by the center countries. Indeed, those countries substituted the production of low 
value-added goods with the production of high value-added goods (the sectors of aerospace, 
telecommunication, and information technology). Consequently, the first list of goods was 
transferred to the peripheral countries which meant that the development gap between the two zones 
increased more and more. 
 
Combes et al. (2000) have used the indicators of economic opening and a series of structural 
variables for different regions of the world (low and middle-income economies and high-income 
economies) to assess the evolution of the instability of growth rates. Thus the authors have 
considered, as a measure of macro-economic instability, the difference between the growth rate of a 
product and a trend value chosen by estimating a representative equation of the growth rate trend. 
Thus an indicator of growth rate instability was calculated over three sub-periods: 1970-1975, 1976-
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1986 and 1987-1995. 
 
The authors conclude that the size of the country appears as a strategic factor which reduces the 
growth rate instability. The authors have provided two justifications. The first is that the policy of 
trade liberalization improves the ability of countries to properly manage external shocks induced by 
an economic opening. Also, it leads to more stable growth and creates a diversification of activities 
allowing "some compensation of economic sectorial cycles". The second is that the center countries 
are structurally less open and, consequently, less exposed to international economic fluctuations. 
Doppenholfer et al. (2004) consider 67 variables and find that only 18 can be considered as robust 
determinants of growth. Among these 18 variables, several can be considered as structural factors, 
such as geographical location, colonial history and the religious composition of the population. 
However, the intensity of trade openness does not have a robust effect on growth. 
 
Mazur (2000) has noted that globalization is one of the most important factors which leads to 
increased inequality. This means that globalization has further enriched the center countries at the 
expense of peripheral countries. However, in our simple view, we believe that the problem of 
underdevelopment lies not only in the simple deterioration of terms of trade or the simple process of 
domination that hegemonic countries exercise over developing countries, but rather in a more 
important factor. In fact, do the development strategies adopted by the center countries determine 
the degree and nature of development which peripheral countries must comply with and accept? 
 
The ex-ante determination of these strategies will lead to an action plan from the center countries 
that revolves around the classic questions that political economics has exposed since its inception: 
what and how to produce? The answer to this question leads, each time, to the setting of productive 
plans which set all other economic variables that are in accordance with the principles of productive 
efficiency (e.g. target markets, market strategies, inputs, etc.). This determines the periphery role that 
productive efficiency must play in every moment of history by providing the peripheral countries 
with the only possibilities allowed by the center. Thus, we believe that the international division of 
labour is the culmination of the development plan adopted and decided upon by the center. The 
persistence of underdevelopment depends in large measure on the difficulty which faces the 
periphery in anticipating the center’s actions in terms of development strategies. 
 
Thus, it seems difficult for small countries like Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria to anticipate EU and 
U.S. strategies in terms of development (type of investment, technological content, new research 
topics etc.). Therefore, faced with an information shortage (which itself is the result of 
underdevelopment), it would be impossible for such countries to adopt the paths of long-term 
growth and consequently create developing development. 
 
The center countries, benefiting from the information gap between them-selves and the periphery 
countries, easily determine the latter’s behavior by forcing them to undergo their development 
program (producing their own in-puts, natural resources exploitation, rent transfer, allowing them to 
sell their outputs in the center’s markets etc.). Indeed, this implicit type of contract, established 
between developing and developed countries, is a specific form of the agency theory applied, in our 
case, on a more aggregated and distant level, rather than on businesses and firms, namely macro-
Nations’ agency problems. 
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3. Estimation method 
The purpose of this paper is to study the effect of growth on growth. Whether it be a case of 
developed or developing countries, an explicit or implicit evaluation, the issue of growth remains at 
the heart of economic analysis and the focus of the vast majority of economists. The point that we 
raise at this stage is that, despite the multitude of works on the issue of economic growth, almost all 
of these studies aim to test the effect of different economic aggregates on growth. We propose, 
however, a study of the reactions of short and long-term growth in developed countries following 
shock growth in developing countries and vice versa. In methodological terms, the idea is to consider 
in which situations economic growth could be considered both a simple economic variable and a 
target variable. 
 
Making use of the approach of SVEC models, this issue will be addressed in two parts. The first part 
will be dedicated to the first sub-model which aims to study the interaction between the growth of 
France as a developed country and the growth of Morocco and Tunisia as developing countries. The 
second part contains the second sub-model which will be devoted to the USA, Canada, Venezuela 
and Cuba. 
3.1. The structural approach 
By overcoming standard VAR models limitations, the pioneering work of Sims (1986), Bernanke 
(1986), Blanchard and Watson (1986) and Blanchard and Quah (1989) aims to specify an 
economically interpretable framework through SVAR model. This kind of structural model was 
designed to allow economists to achieve a more rigorous interpretation of the transmission of an 
economic policy impulse to the economy2. Using economic fundamentals, SVAR methodology try to 
detect a set of independent shocks through the imposition of few short and / or long-term 
identification restrictions3. 
The general form of SVAR model can be expressed as follows: 
  
ܤ଴ ௧ܻ=∑ ܤ௜௣௜ୀଵ ௧ܻି௜+ݓ௧                                                           (1) 
 
where the matrix ܤ଴ of (ܰ × ܰ) dimension contains terms equal to the uniton the main diagonal that 
expresses the simultaneity relationship between the variables constituting ௧ܻ . The squared matricesܤ௜ , 
                                               
2 Analysing results from a VAR model is made by studying causality between variables, forecast error variance 
decomposition and impulse response functions. Through these tools, SVAR methodology considerably succeeded in two 
major areas of research: the interpretation of business cycle fluctuations of macroeconomic variables and identification of 
the effects and transmission mechanisms of economic policies. 
3 These restrictions are considered short-term when they express lack of instantaneous responses of some variables to 
some structural impulses. However, when some impulses have no lasting effect on some components of the system, the 
restrictions are long term. 
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for ݅ =1, … , ݌, contain thestructural parameters of the model and the vector ݓ௧= (ݓ௜௧ … ݓ௡௧)’ 
containsܰstructural innovations (shocks). 
The reduced form (standard VAR) of the SVAR model can be written as follows: 
 
                                ௧ܻ= ∑ ܤ௢ିଵ௣௜ୀଵ ܤ௜ ௧ܻି௜+ܤ௢ିଵݓ௧                                                   (2) 
 
                                               = ∑ ܣ௜௣௜ୀଵ ௧ܻିଵ+ߝ௧                                                             (3) 
 
where ܣ௜, for ݅ =1, … , ݌,are the squared matrices related to lagged vectors ௧ܻି௜for lag order ݌, 
containing the model parameters. The vector ߝଵ௧= (ߝଵ௧ … ߝே௧)contains the N canonical innovations. 
The variance-covariance matrix is asymmetric (ܰ × ܰ) matrix describing the stochastic 
interdependence structureof canonical innovations ߝ௧ . We can note from (1) and (2) that SVAR 
representation is derived from the reduced VAR representation assuming that the vector of canonical 
innovations εt is a linear combination of structural innovations wt of the same date ߝ௧ =  ܤ௢ିଵݓ௧. 
To identify the SVAR model, we should first estimate the standard VAR model, since the matrix ܤ௢  
is unknown. The variance-covariance matrix  ∑ఌ  is symmetric which means that,ே(ேାଵ)ଶ  
restrictions are provided by the model. However, ܤ௢contains ܰଶ unknown elements. Then, at least 
ே(ேିଵ)
ଶ
 additional restrictions remain to identify the structural form. Given that ܤ௢contains ܰଶ 
unknown elements. Then, at least ே(ேିଵ)
ଶ
 additional restrictions remain to identify the structural 
form4. 
3.2. SVECM  
To ensure the existence of a vector moving average (VMA) form of the model, both short-run and 
long-run approaches of the SVAR model identification are supposed to be applied to stationary 
models in level or in difference. When a VAR model contains components I(1) and econometric 
tests reveal the pres-ence of cointegration relationships between the variables then, it is no longer 
appropriate to keep the VAR specification and a VECM should be specified6 . 
 
The cointegration theory, initiated by Granger (1981, 1983), Granger and Weiss (1983) and Engle 
and Granger (1987), states that if there is at least one stationary linear combination between I(1) 
series of the model, they are called cointegrated7. According to this theory, linear relationships 
between I(1) components can be considred as long term equilibrium relationships leading, to some 
extent, to compensating the non-stationary series. 
 
Assuming that the number of components constituting ௧ܻ  at the VAR equation presented by (2) is N 
= 3 for the first sub-model (N = 4 for the second sub-model) and that these three (four) series are 
I(1) and are cointegrated of order (1, 1), the VAR model should be transformed to a VECM form as 
                                               
4 ……… 
Commentaire [M1]: Please insert all 
footnotres! 
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follows: 
 
∆ ௧ܻ=ߙߚ′ ௧ܻିଵ+∑ ߁ ௜௣ିଵ௜ୀଵ ∆ ௧ܻି௜ + ߝ௧                                             (4) 
 
= ߨ ௧ܻିଵ+∑ ߁ ௜௣ିଵ௜ୀଵ ∆ ௧ܻି௜ + ߝ௧                                               (5)   
where  is the first difference operator, With Γ ௜=− (ܣ௜ାଵ + ⋯ + ܣ௣)for ݅ =  1, . . . , ݌ −  1, the 
rank of ߨ = −(ܫ௡ −ܣ௧ − … − ܣ௣) is equal to ݎ <  3 (for the first sub model (ݎ <  4 for the second 
sub-model). which is equivalent  to conside that ݎ =  1, because all three series (four series) are co-
integrated of order (1, 1)), and ߙ (the weight matrix) and ߚ (the cointegration matrix) are of 
dimension (3, 1), ((4,1) for the second sub-model) and of a rank equal to ݎ =  1. 
 
Ones the VECM is specified, we need to reverse its expression to deduce the VMA form necessary 
for both of reduced and structural impulse response functions (IRF) and forecast errors variance 
decompositions (DVEP). The ap-proach used in this regard is the common trend one introduced by 
Warne (1991, 1993), Lütkepohl and Reimers (1992) and Johanson (1995). According to this 
representation, the long-term co-movement of cointegrated series is governed by a common trend, 
which reduces consequently the number of stochastic trends.  
 
More explicitly, when the rank of a cointegration vector ௧ܻ  CI(1, 1) is r = 1, it is possible to consider 
through the application of the common trend representation that r stochastic trends are eliminated 
and that it remains in the first sub-model case for example only k = N − r = 2 (k = N − r = 3 for the 
second sub-model) trends which become common to the N components of ௧ܻ. 
Referring to the Granger representation theorem, the VECM equation given by (5) can be rewritten 
as the VMA form of Beveridge-Nelson decomposition of Yt as follows:  
௧ܻ= ௢ܻ∗ + +ߌ∗(ܮ)ߝ௧+Ξ∑ ߝ௜௧௜ୀଵ                                                     (6) 
 
௧ܻ= ௢ܻ∗ += ௧ܻௌ + ௧ܻ௉                                                               (7) 
 
௢ܻ
∗ contains the initial value of the series, ௧ܻ௦ = Ξ∗ܮ(ߝ௧)=∑ Ξ௝∗∞௝ୀ଴ ߝ௧ି௝is the stationary component of 
௧ܻ , ௧ܻ
௉ = Ξ ∑ ߝ௜௧௜ୀଵ  is the permanent component of ௧ܻ and = ߚୄ[ߙୄ′ ൫ܫே − ∑ ߁௜௣ିଵ௜ୀଵ ൯ߚୄ]-1ߙୄ′ .  
According to this representation, the process ௧ܻ is decomposed into two parts: I(0)and I(1). As 
described by the equation (6), the process ௧ܻ is governed by r components I(0) represented by Yts and 
k = N − r components I(1) represented by Ytp13. Ones the N structural innovations wt, deduced from 
the expression εt = B0−1wt, are identified, we may consider that only r of them have short-term 
effects. The permanent e ects of structural shocks is given by substituting ε t = B0−1wt in the 
expression of common trend Ξܤ଴ିଵ ∑ ݓ௜௧௜ୀଵ  .  
It follows then that the long-term effects of structural shocks wt are given15 by the matrix Ξܤ଴ିଵ. 
Taking into account aforementioned information, we need 1/2 r(r − 1) restrictions to identify 
transitory shocks and 1/2 k(k − 1) restrictions to identify permanent shocks to cover the N(N-1)/2 
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additional restrictions necessary for structural model. 
It therefore follows that the first sub-model, where the vector Yt consists of three I(1) series 
cointegrated of order (1, 1), suppose the imposition of  1/2r(r − 1) = 0 additional restriction to 
identify temporary shocks and 1/2 k(k − 1) = 1 additional restriction to identify permanent shocks. 
The structural innovations vector wt admits three shocks: two permanent shocks as the two first 
com-ponents of wt and a third transitory shock. Assuming that the second long term shock exerts no 
permanent effect on the first variable, we may write the restrictions as follows: 
 
ߌܤ଴
ିଵ=൥
∗ 0 0
∗ ∗ 0
∗ ∗ 0
൩and ܤ଴ିଵ= ቈ
∗ ∗ ∗
∗ ∗ ∗
∗ ∗ ∗
቉                                             (8) 
 
Concerning the second sub-model with four I(1) series cointegrated of order (1, 1), the restrictions 
needed for identification are given by 1/2 r(r − 1) = 0 additional restriction to identify transitory 
shocks and 1/2k(k − 1) = 3 additional restrictions for permanent shocks. The identification scheme 
assumes placing the three permanent shocks as the first components of the vector wt. The 
identification is also realized by assuming that the third long term shock exerts no permanent effect 
neither on the first variable nor on the second one and that the second long term shock exerts no 
permanent effect on the third variable. Restrictions of the second sub-model should therefore be 
written as follows: 
 
ߌܤ଴
ିଵ=቎
∗ ∗ 0      0
∗ ∗ 0       0
∗ 0 ∗       0
∗     ∗      ∗      0
቏and ܤ଴ିଵ= ቎
∗ ∗ ∗     ∗
∗ ∗ ∗      ∗
∗ ∗ ∗     ∗
 ∗     ∗      ∗    ∗ 
቏                                 (9) 
 
4. Data  
As mentioned above, our paper contains two sub-models. The first sub-model which is a trivariate 
model aims to study the interraction between the growth of France (GDP FR), the growth of 
Morroco (GDP MOR) and the growth of Tunisia (GDP TU). The series of GDP FR (constant 2000 
US$), GDP MOR (constant 2000 US$) and GDP TU (constant 2000 US$) are obtained from the 
World Bank. Data are annual and spread over the 1961-2011 period for France, Morocco and 
Tunisia. 
  
 
The second sub-model consists of four variables: US growth (GDP US), Canadian growth (GDP 
CAN), Venezuelan growth (GDP VEN) and Cuban growth (GDP CUB). Data are obtained from 
the same first sub-model source and cover the period 1970-2010. 
 
Referring to the usual unit root tests (Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips Perron (PP)), 
both of logarithms of the first sub-model series and log-arithms of the second sub-model series are 
I(1) (see Tables 1 and 2). Moreover, the two sub-models are caracterised by an upward trend in their 
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series (see graphs 1 and 2). So we suspect the existence of a cointegration relation between the 
variables of each sub-model. Johansen procedure (1988) will be applied to test the presence of 
cointegration for our two sub-models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 - Evolution of logarithms of GDP FR, GDP MOR and GDP TU during 1961-2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 - Evolution of logarithms of GDP US, GDP CAN, GDP CUB and GDP VEN during 
1970-2010 
 
 
            35                                                                      2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 - First sub-model’s results of ADF and PP tests 
 
  ADF  PP 
Variables ——————————— ——————————— 
 level First difference level First difference 
     
GDPFR -2.015 -10.301 -2.113 -10.434 
GDPMOR -1.012 -10.296 -1.334 -10.311 
GDPTU -2.011 -7.056 -2.207 -7.056 
5% critical value -2.922 -2.922 -2.921 -2.922 
 
 
Table 2 - Second sub-model’s results of ADF and PP tests 
 
  ADF  PP 
Variables ——————————— ——————————— 
 level First difference level First difference 
     
GDP US -1.579 -4.626 -1.711 -4.418 
GDP CAN -2.178 -4.337 -1.959 -4.177 
GDP VEN -0.489 -4.966 -0.572 -4.835 
GDP CUB -1.205 -3.434 -1.285 -3.430 
5% critical value -2.936 -2.938 -2.936 -2.938 
 
 
It is worth noting that application of Johansen procedure (1988) is crucially related to the choice of 
the retained specifications16. In other words, it should be précised whether cointegration and VECM 
contain or not constant and / or trend. The specification adopted in our two sub-models is the one 
that assumes absence of trend in the cointegration relations and the presence of constant in the 
VECMs. Two motivations are behind such choice. The first economic reason is that the trend does 
not intervene in the long-term relation linking different levels of growth. This is especially confirmed 
when dealing with growth gap between developing and developed countries. The second motivation 
associated with the presence of a constant in the VECM back to the fact that, for both of our two 
sub-models, logarithmic series have an upward linear trend. 
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Results related to the trace test statistics of the two considered models are summarized in table 3. 
The calculated values of the trace statistics for both of the first and the second model are respectively 
45.72 and 55.87. Given that these values are higher than critical value at a 5% risk level (35.07 for the 
first model and 53.94 for the second one), we reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration for the 
both models. However, we accept the null hypothesis according to which there is at most one 
cointegration relation (18.75 < 20.16 for the first sub-model and 27.04 < 35.07 for the second sub-
model) at a 5% risk level. Which means that the trace test procedure should be stopped at the 
cointegration rank r = 1. It follows then that the appropriate specification that should be retained for 
our both models is the multivariate VECM18 .The choice of the VECM order is based on the AIC 
selection criterion. We retain a number of lags in our VECMs equal to 1 for the first sub-model and 
2 for the second sub-model. 
 
Table 3: Johansen cointegration tests 
 
Sub-model Number of 
cointegrating 
vector 
Eigenvalue Trace statistic Rank r 
1st sub-model None 45.72 35.07 0 
 Almost one 18.75 20.16 1 
 Almost two 7.29 9.14 2 
2nd sub-model None 55.87 53.94 0 
 Almost one 27.04 35.07 1 
 Almost two 9.19 20.16 2 
 Almost three 2.26 9.14 3 
 
As mentioned above, once VECM form of each sub-model is estimated, deduction of their structural 
form depends on the identification of the matrix 
B0−1. Given that the first sub-model is a trivariate model with one cointegration relation, the just 
identification of its SVECM form requires only one long-term additional restriction (1/2 r(r − 1) = 0 
et 1/2k(k − 1) = 1). However, the second sub-model includes four series characterised by one 
cointegration relation. Which means, in this case, that the identification of the SVECM form needs 
three long-term additional restrictions ( 1/2r(r − 1) = 0 et 1/2 k(k − 1) = 3). 
 
Economically speaking, with the exception of the third restriction of the second sub-model, all 
restrictions of our two sub-models are imposed so that the shock of growth in less developed 
countries has no persistent effect on the most developed countries’ growth. Indeed, the identification 
scheme of the first sub-model assumes that Moroccan growth shock has no long-term effect on 
French growth. Leaving as with the form of restriction described by equation (7). 
 
In the case of the second sub-model, the first two restrictions assume that Venezuelan growth shock 
is of no persistent effect neither on the American growth nor on the Canadian one. The third 
restriction is imposed such that Canadian growth shock has no long-term effect on Venezuelan 
growth. The theoretical underpinning of this last restriction back to the near absence of economic 
relations between the two considered countries. The structural innovations vector wt contains four 
shocks: three permanent shocks (the American shock, the Canadian shock and the Venezuelan 
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shock) and a transitory shock (the Cuban shock). Respecting this order of shocks at the level of 
vector wt, the restriction takes the form described by equation (8). 
 
 
 
5. Results analysis and economic implications  
Generally, to study the effects of growth shocks on growth or any other similar problematic, we 
should resort to a dynamic multivariate analysis. Thus, in this paper we propose a study of two panels 
of countries. As mentioned above, the first one is comprised of France, Morocco and Tunisia. The 
second group is comprised of the U.S., Canada, Venezuela and Cuba. Our choices are based on the 
necessary simultaneous existence, in each of the two groups, of a hegemonic country and peripheral 
countries. Indeed, in the first panel of countries, France represents the hegemonic country while 
Morocco and Tunisia are the peripheral ones. In the second model, it is clear that the U.S. and 
Canada are considered to be hegemonic countries while Cuba and Venezuela are considered 
peripheral countries. We believe that the economic sensitivity of the two samples of countries to 
growth shocks should be treated both in the short-term and in the long-term. 
5.1. The first sub-model  
Recall that the first sub-model contains two long-term shocks and one short-term shock. Thus, only 
one additional restriction is maintained to identify this model; the Moroccan shock has no long-term 
effects on French growth. 
5.1.1. Responses to long-term shocks  
According to figure (3), we note that the long-term GDP growth shock effects in France were 
simultaneously positive and increasing in France and Morocco, and negative and decreasing in 
Tunisia. Thus, it seems that the Moroccan economy contributes actively to French growth and 
benefits consequently from their growth shocks. This allows us to confirm that Morocco is 
becoming, more and more, a new economic power in the north of Africa, given its dynamics and 
competitiveness. The latter have allowed Morocco to become an attractive place for French 
investments. However, in the case of Tunisia, we note that the long-term French shocks have had 
negative and decreasing effects. This can be explained by its large dependence on France.  According to the impulse response functions associated with figure (4), we note that the long-term 
growth shock effects in Morocco are negative and de-creasing in France; but positive and increasing 
in Morocco and Tunisia. So, it seems that a complementary economic relationship exists between 
Morocco and France, which is explained by the mechanism of French investment in Morocco. 
Indeed, it is plausible to assume that Morocco’s growth shock are, in part, the result of the shocks 
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that French companies face (Total, Vivendi Universal, Suez, EDF, Renault.etc.) in Morocco (French 
investments represent 51% of the total foreign direct investment). However, Tunisia has largely 
benefitted from the Moroccan shock for the simple reason that the two countries share the same 
comparative advantages and therefore each country benefits from the others’ shocks. 
 
 
 
                          
 
Figure 3 - Responses of GDP FR, GDP MOR and GDP TU (top to bottom) to the French growth 
shock (the first long term shock) with 95% Hall percentile bootstrap confidence interval based on 
1000 bootstrap replications. 
5.1.2. Responses to short-term shock  
By referring to figure (5), we note that the long-term effect of the Tunisian growth shock is positive 
and decreasing in France, Morocco and Tunisia. In addition, it seems that France benefits more from 
Tunisian shocks. This can be explained by the depth of economic interdependence (historically 
determined) between the two countries. Similarly, Morocco benefits from Tunisian shocks to the 
extent that, at the time of impact, the degradation of Tunisian productive sectors benefits Moroccan 
businesses, especially those which evolve in the competitive sectors (tourism, mechanical and 
electrical industry, food etc..). Table (4) summarizes all the results discussed above. 
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 Figure 4 - Responses of GDP FR, GDP MOR and GDP TU (top to bottom)to the Morocan growth 
shock (the second long term shock) with 95% Hallpercentile bootstrap confidence interval based on 
1000 bootstrap replications 
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Figure 5: Responses of GDP FR, GDP MOR and GDP TU (top to bottom) to the Tunisian growth 
shock (the short term shock) with 95% Hall percentile bootstrap confidence interval based on 1000 
bootstrap replications 
 
Table 4 - 1stsub-model Impulse responses functions summary 
 
Shocks Frensh response Morocan response Tunisian response  
France ( ) and increasing ( ) and increasing ( ) and increasing  
     
Morocco (–) and increasing ( ) and increasing ( ) and increasing  
     
Tunisia ( ) and decreasing Almost zero ( ) and increasing  
      
 
5.1.3. Forecast error variance decomposition 
From figure (6) we can note that the French shock is explained in the short and medium-term, 
by the same shock. However, in the long-term, the shock depends much more on the Tunisian 
shock. Thus, this confirms that France continues to solve its growth problems by exploiting 
opportunities that peripheral countries offer them. 
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It is also noted that the Moroccan shocks are largely dependent on France’s growth, both in 
the short and long-term. This implies that the economic relationship between the two 
countries is strategic and has been built on inter-temporal decisions, orienting French 
companies towards the Moroccan market. This behaviour is explained by the incentive 
scheme, Morocco’s economic policy and the fact that Morocco tried to be integrated into the 
Euro-Zone as a trade partner, especially given the comparative advantages that Morocco has 
compared to Algeria and Tunisia. Equally, it seems that this relationship is complementary 
rather than competitive which explains why, in the long-run, the shocks in Morocco are 
managed at all times by the Moroccan shock and in major part by the French shock. 
 
In the case of Tunisia, we note that growth shocks are largely explained by French and 
especially Moroccan shocks. In other words, Tunisian growth is negatively correlated to 
Morocco. This is due to the similarity of their comparative advantages and economic 
structures which implies that each country benefits a lot, in terms of growth, from the other’s 
loss. In the long-run, this situation becomes stronger and more and more confirmed. 
  
 
  
 Figure 6 - Forecast error variance decomposition of GDP FR, GDP MOR and GDP TU (top to 
bottom) with relative contributions of French shock, Morocan shock and Tunisian shock.  
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5.2. The second sub-model  
As mentioned before, the second sub-model is a model that contains three long-term shocks and one 
short-term shock. Three restrictions are imposed to identify this model. The first two restrictions 
consider that the Venezuelan shock has no long-term effect on U.S. and Canadian growth. The third 
restriction expresses the absence of a long-term Canadian shock effect on Venezuelan growth. 
5.2.1. Responses to long-term shocks 
According to figure (7), it is clear that the long-term effects of the U.S. growth shock on the four 
countries in our sample vary significantly. Indeed, the effects are positive and increasing in the U.S., 
slightly positive and increasing in Canada, negative and decreasing in Cuba and almost zero in 
Venezuela. It is often noticed that the U.S. economy benefited in the long-run from its own, either 
positive or negative, shocks, as may be illustrated by the various important crises affecting this 
country (e.g. 1929, 1973, and 2008 which are cited as simple illustrations). Thus, can we say that the 
Schumpeterian concept of "creative destruction" is still valid to explain the behaviour of the U.S. 
economy? The answer to this question is a priori positive given that the stylized facts have shown 
that such shocks are a major source of long-term expansion. Regarding the effect of the U.S.A’s 
growth shock on Canada’s growth, we note that despite its positivity, it is low. This goes against our 
intuition especially since both countries are highly integrated. 
 
The long-term impact of U.S. growth on Cuban growth is negative and de-creasing which means 
that, despite the U.S. economic embargo on Cuba (in place since 1962), the Cuban economy is 
largely dependent on the U.S economy. This leads us to say that the USA and Cuba have a strange 
relationship. Indeed, it involves a hegemonic country (USA) having a conflict with a small country 
(Cuba), their relationship eventually establishing a tight embargo causing a developmental delay (this 
embargo was strengthened by the Helms-Burton enactment in 1996). However, the United States’ 
role as the godfather of the Cuban economy in many sectors of the economy (because they satisfy 
the majority of their food imports, technology, etc..), allows us to say that the center countries are the 
first to penalize countries that do not share their ideological bases and the first to aim to benefit from 
all the opportunities that the underdeveloped countries offer. 
 
The effect of a long-term impact of U.S. growth on Venezuelan growth is almost zero which means 
there is total economic independence between the two countries. This is explained by many reasons, 
primarily the political conflict between the two countries (the arrival of a socialist government in 
power since 1999), which has prompted Venezuela to seek new business partners in Latin America 
and elsewhere. Despite the fact that the U.S. growth shock did not have a significant effect on 
Canadian growth (Figure 7), we note from Figure (8) that the long-term effect of a Canadian growth 
shock on U.S. growth is positive and increasing. Thus, we can conclude at this stage of analysis that 
the U.S. economy immediately responded and reacted to the Canadian shock. In other words, we can 
say that NAFTA / NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) has allowed the U.S. economy 
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to benefit more in terms of growth. A priori, the Canadian degrowth is solved partly by the U.S 
economy’s positive response (which benefits in terms of investment, production and capital flows).  
 
Also, the Canadian shock had a positive and increasing effect on Cuban growth, which clearly shows 
the existence of trade flows between the two countries as well as a degree of interdependence, 
despite the economic embargo which the country was facing. However, no e ect of that shock is 
recorded in Venezuela. The economic independence of the two economies may be explained by 
political considerations that are part of the logic of ideological conflicts (cap-italism vs. socialism). 
 
According to Figure (9), we note that the long-term effect of a growth shock in Venezuela is slightly 
positive and quasi-stationary in the U.S.A, slightly negative and stationary in Canada and positive and 
increasing in Cuba and Venezuela. The weak reactions of Canadian and American growth following a 
Venezuelan growth shock reflects the nature of the relationship between these two groups of 
countries that appears to be based on political and economic conflicts between two different and 
even opposing ideologies. Indeed, the willingness of some countries in Latin America to get rid of 
the U.S.A’s hegemony and influence leads to the creation of new commercial zones that can counter 
the capitalist free trade zones. The integration of Canada and the U.S. into NAFTA, and of 
Venezuela into ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America) has created a degree of 
independence and/or economic dichotomy between members of these two zones. 
5.2.2. Responses to short-term shock 
Referring to Figure (10), we note that the short-term effect of the Cuban growth shock on American 
growth follows three phases. In the first, we notice that there is an immediate, negative and 
increasing effect until it reaches, at the end of the second period, its minimum level. In the second 
phase, the effect decreases, while in the third and final phase, the effect is cancelled. It follows from 
the above that the American response to the Cuban economy shock is subject to the principle of 
prudence (act within the limits allowed by policy constraints without, however, contributing to 
growth). The Canadian response is relatively worse than the American one. This is explained by the 
fact that Canada is one of the most important economic partners of Cuba (in addition to Argentina, 
China and Spain). Consequently, faced with the Cuban shock, the Canadian economy is affected by a 
loss of profits over time. 
 
In the case of Cuba, we note that the short-term instantaneous effect of the Cuban growth shock on 
Cuban growth is decreasing, despite its positivity in the first period. Over the next three years, this 
effect is negative before being cancelled later. It follows from such information that Cuba is 
struggling to manage its own shocks, which depend, in large measure, on the outside especially the 
U.S. and Canada which are considered to be their most important trade partners. 
 
Three basic ideas can be deduced from Table (5) which summarizes the in-formation discussed 
above relating to the second sub-model. Firstly, the growth impact of a hegemonic country (U.S) 
does not benefit any country including, amongst others, its traditional trading partners (Canada). Also 
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a hegemonic country such as the U.S. benefits from its own shocks as well as from those which 
occur in other countries (Canada, Venezuela). Secondly, the Canadian growth impact benefits all 
other countries except Venezuela. However, this country benefits only from its own shocks. Thirdly, 
Cuba and Venezuela benefit mutually from their own shocks. 
 
 
Figure 7 - Responses of GDP US, GDP CA, GDP VEN and GDP CUB (top to bottom) to the 
American growth shock (the first long term shock) with 95% Hall percentile bootstrap confidence 
interval based on 1000 bootstrap replications. 
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Figure 8 - Responses of GDP US, GDP CA, GDP VEN and GDP CUB (top to bottom) to the 
Canadian growth shock (the second long term shock) with 95% Hall percentile bootstrap confidence 
interval based on 1000 bootstrap replications 
 
 
Figure 9 - Responses of GDP US, GDP CA, GDP VEN and GDP CUB (top tobottom) to the 
Venezuelan growth shock (the third long term shock) with 95% Hall percentile bootstrap confidence 
interval based on 1000 bootstrap replications                         
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Figure 10: Responses of GDP US, GDP CA, GDP VEN and GDP CUB (top to bottom) to the 
Cuban growth shock (the short term shock) with 95% Hall percentile bootstrap confidence interval 
based on 1000 bootstrap replications 
 Figure 11 - Forecast error variance decomposition of GDP US, GDP CAN, GDP VEN and GDP 
CUB (top to bottom) with relative contributions of American shock, Canadian shock, Venezuelan 
shock and Cuban shock 
 
Table - 2nd sub-model Impulse responses functions summary 
 
Shocks American 
response 
Canadian 
response 
Venezuelan 
response 
Cuban 
response 
U.S (+) and 
increasing 
Almost 
zero 
Almost zero (–) and 
decreasing 
Canada (+) and 
increasing 
(+) and 
increasing 
Almost zero (+) and 
increasing 
Venezuela Slightly (+) 
and constant 
Slightly (–) 
and 
constant 
(+) and 
increasing 
(+) and 
increasing 
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Cuba (–) and 
increasing, 
(+) and 
decreasing 
and vanishes 
from the 
seventh 
period 
(–) and 
increasing 
and 
vanishes 
from the 
third 
period 
(+ ) and 
decreasing, 
(–) and 
increasing 
and vanishes 
from the 
third period 
(–) and 
increasing 
and vanishes 
from the 
second 
period 
 
5.2.3. Forecast error variance decomposition21 
According to Figure (11) associated with the forecast error variance decomposition of the second 
sub-model, we note that Canada is one of the major sources behind U.S. growth. Also, Canadian 
growth is largely dependent on the U.S. However, Venezuela is gradually in the process of 
becoming more and more independent because it has chosen to cooperate on an economic level 
with non-capitalist countries. 
6. Concluding remarks 
To conclude this paper, we can state that the development process is not totally dependent on the 
liberal theories stipulating that free exchange can instantaneously promote the growth of all trade 
partners. Indeed, behind apparent trade relations, there exists a balance of power that favours 
developed countries to the detriment of those developing. Our empirical study has showed that 
hegemonic countries, such as France and the U.S., benefit from their trade partners’ shocks, 
especially those of the less developed. 
The main results show that the peripheral countries integration into trade relations with center 
countries may allow short and medium term growth; it prevents them from confirming their long-
term economic independence. Therefore, the policy implications of the paper are that the peripheral 
countries should base their growth on the creation of economic sectors with high added values. Also, 
they should rethinking their current integrations and build new trade relations with other peripheral 
countries far away of the power and the dominance of center countries. 
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